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Introduction 
Since its establishment in 1989 Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan (The Islamic Unity Party 
of Afghanistan) has been an important political and military player in Afghanistan. Like most 
contemporary major political parties in Afghanistan, Hizb-e Wahdat is rooted in the turbulent 
period of the anti-Soviet resistance movements in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It was formed to 
bring together nine separate and mostly inimical military and ideological groups into a single 
entity. During the period of the civil war in the early 1990s, it emerged as one of the major 
actors in Kabul and some other parts of the country. Political Islamism was the ideology of 
most of its key leaders but it gradually tilted towards its Hazara ethnic support base and 
became the key vehicle of the community’s political demands and aspirations. Its ideological 
background and ethnic support base has continuously shaped its character and political 
agenda. Through the jihad and the civil war, Wahdat accumulated significant political capital 
among Afghanistan’s Hazaras, which arguably could have been spent in the establishment of 
long-lasting political institutions in Afghanistan.  
 
By 2009, however, Wahdat was so fragmented and divided that the political weight it carried 
in the country bore little resemblance to what it had once been. It had fragmented into at least 
four competing organisations, each claiming ownership of the name and legacy of Wahdat.   
 
This paper aims to explain the historical background and processes in which the party was 
formed and then lays out its political agendas and strategies, as well as its eventual 
disintegration. It will also look at how its character, political agenda and strategies have 
evolved throughout the years of civil war, Taliban rule and the post-2001 political process.  
 
Background  
Following the collapse of the pro-Soviet Kabul government in the Hazarajat in 1979, the 
region fell under the control of Shuray-e Ittefaq, a hastily assembled region-wide organisation 
(Ibrahimi 2006; Farr 1988). Soon it was challenged and overthrown by several new radical 
Islamist groups that engaged in endless power and ideological struggles that engulfed the 
region for most of the 1980s. The wars and conflicts were launched and fought with strong 
ideological fervour. However, none of the organisations were able to determine the outcome 
of the war in their favour (Dawlatabadi 1992). Towards the second half of the 1980s a 
complete stalemate was emerging in the region, with each organisation confined to specific 
pockets of territory. The devastation and atrocities perpetrated during the war were eroding 
the credibility of their ideologies and leaderships. As a result, there was an overwhelming 
desire for change felt both by the villagers and senior leaders of the organisations (Ibrahimi 
2009a; Samangani 2001). 
 
Several attempts to make peace and ensure stability had failed. Alliances and coalitions were 
being crafted and dismantled. The most important and effective of them were the Shuray-e 
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Eatelaf, an alliance of eight major organisations formed in Tehran in 1985. It was the most 
effective attempt to achieve unity of action by the leaderships of the organisations and was to 
become an important precedent for the formation of Wahdat. However, while the alliance 
provided the Hazara mujahedin with a common political voice in negotiations and bargaining 
with the Sunni organisations based in Peshawar, it failed to tackle the incessant infighting on 
the ground. To stabilise the region a more radical move was required (Dawlatabadi 1999; 
Erfani 1993). 
 
With the announcement of the Soviet withdrawal in January 1988, the collapse of the Kabul 
government was believed to be imminent and a dramatic reconfiguration of political 
alignments was in the making. This was happening at a time when the Kabul government and 
the ruling Hizb-e Democratik-e Khalq (People’s Democratic Party, PDPA) were experiencing 
intensive factional and ethnic rivalries. A declining faith in the future of the government 
facilitated the emergence of new political alignments largely between members of the same 
ethnic groups, cutting across the ideological divide between the mujahedin and the PDPA 
officials. In the meantime, negotiations on the formation of an interim government led by the 
Sunni organisations based in Peshawar excluded the Hazara alliance based in Tehran. The 
combined effect of these developments among the Hazara organisations was greater 
awareness of the need for a more collective and assertive bargaining with their Sunni 
counterparts if they were to be taken seriously.  
 
It was against this background that a more radical demand of unification and merger of all 
existing politico-military organisations into a single party dominated the politics of the region. 
Several meetings were held throughout the region in which the nature and composition of the 
new party and the role of existing organisations in it were extensively debated. In August 
1988, the provincial centre of Bamyan fell into the hand of Hazara mujahedin. This further 
facilitated and encouraged the formation of a regional organisation. The operation that 
resulted in the collapse of government in the town was jointly coordinated by different 
mujahedin forces in the region. Sazman-e Nasr (Victory Organisation) played a central and 
coordinating role in the attack. This development marked the elimination of any presence of 
the Kabul government within the entire Hazarajat region (Qurban Ali Erfani, interview, 
2007). 
 
Henceforth Bamyan was the centre of important political developments. It injected a new 
stimulus into the ongoing unification process among the mujahedin organisations in the 
region. The town hosted the final meeting that resulted in the declaration of the misaq-e 
wahdat, or the unity treaty in July 1989 less than a year after its liberation. It became a centre 
of political leadership and power for the new party beyond and away from the local factional 
and personal rivalries of local commanders.  
 
What contrasted the negotiation process for the formation of Wahdat with similar previous 
efforts was that it was essentially a process initiated from within the Hazarajat region. The 
process was informed and shaped by the realities of war, factionalism and loss of control of 
the political leaderships over military commanders within the region. Conversely, the 
previous coalition-building efforts were centred in Iran and were often under the direct 
influence of the Iranian authorities. Once it was formed, its leaders faced the challenge of 
convincing their representatives at the Shuray-e Eatelaf and officials of the Iranian 
government, who were more at ease with dealing with a coalition of separate parties in 
Tehran. The fragmentation of the Hazara mujahedin had given the Iranians effective leverage 
to control small organisations, often tied to various religious authorities and government 
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agencies in Iran. The Iranians feared that a single party based inside Afghanistan could mean 
they would lose control over the movement. Furthermore, the increasingly evident ethnic 
discourse within the party was seen unfavourably by the Iranian authorities who had for years 
tried to promote a more pan-Shiite political Islamism during the period of jihad. Husain 
Ibrahimi, the representative of the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Afghan affairs at 
that time, is alleged to have tried to prevent the formation of Hizb-e Wahdat in order to 
maintain his influence (Former senior Wahdat official, interview, 2008). Eventually, once the 
party was formed, the Iranians decided to work with it and supported it in the early days of its 
existence. However, as the subsequent course of political developments discussed below 
shows, the party was to pursue a rather independent political strategy, often in conflict with 
Iranian policies and interests in the country.  
 
Hizb-e Wahdat, a Party of Unity 
As the name Wahdat indicates, the main objective of the party was to unify all Shiite 
mujahedin organisations under a single political leadership. It was created in response to a 
strong urge for unity among the Hazara leaders as well as commoners (Canfield 2004; 
Harpviken 1998).  
In its organisational hierarchy, the party included the following key structures:  
• Shuray-e Aali Nezarat, or the Supreme Supervisory Council, was meant to 
include high ranking religious figures and experts. In its supervisory role, the 
council was tasked to monitor all levels of the party and serve as the highest 
leadership and control mechanism over all activities and policies of the party. 
• The next and most important body within the party was its Central Council. 
This organ was the most powerful deliberative and decision-making authority 
within the party. Because of the importance attached to it, its membership 
expanded in a most dramatic manner. Originally, it was planned to include 36 
members, but the growing need for expansion and inclusion of other figures 
and groups into the party resulted in a constant increase in size. The first 
congress of the party in September 1991 urged the party leadership to 
facilitate integration of other Shiite groups and figures into the party. As such 
it was also resolved that the central and supervisory councils could be 
expanded as needed (Erfani 1993: 271). At its peak, the Central Council 
included more than 80 members representing nearly all religious and political 
groups and influential figures in the region, as well as Hazara figures from the 
cities. It was through membership and division of power within this council 
that the party managed to hold the previously fragmented and hostile Hazara 
political groupings together.  
• The Wahdat Manifesto also provided for the formation of provincial- and 
district-level councils that would report to their relevant committees at the 
headquarters in Bamyan.  
 
The search for change and unity was instigated and led in particular by the senior leaders of 
the two main organisations, Pasdaran and Nasr, which were the most exposed to the threat of 
deligitimisation as a result of their loss of control over their military commanders (Ibrahimi 
2009a: 30-1). The path to unity had been a painstakingly long and complex process, which 
experienced repeated setbacks and obstacles, because each party sought to maximise their role 
in the process. This turned out to be a major contentious issue throughout several rounds of 
negotiations in the run up to formation of the party. Smaller parties pressed for equal 
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representation of all groups while the more powerful ones demanded greater power and a 
share of the positions in the unified party.  Eventually the latter argument prevailed; Nasr and 
Pasdaran persuaded other organisations to concede to proportional representation.  
 
Smaller parties were pressured and even intimidated into joining the process. Many groups 
had no other choice than joining it: the cost of standing outside would have been unbearable. 
The following two examples provide insight into the complexity of the process. Harakat-e 
Islami, led by Shaikh Asif Mohsini, was the main Shiite party that refused to join Wahdat. 
The party was dominated by non-Hazara Shiites. Initially, the party was represented in a 
series of negotiations, but Mohsini later declined to sign, having presented a number of 
conditions to be met. His conditions were interpreted as an unwillingness to join a party in 
which historical Hazara grievances and political aspirations predominated. Nonetheless, 
sections of his party joined Hizb-e Wahdat either because the new party was more promising 
for the political future of the Hazaras or because the pressure to join was so strong that it 
could not be resisted. The party’s core could resist the pressure to join mainly because it was 
located outside the region. However, it did lose a substantial section of its Hazara following to 
Hizb-e Wahdat, a fact underlining the growing importance of ethnic identities in the aftermath 
of jihad in the country (Harpviken 1998: 103). 
 
The military class that had flourished during the civil war posed one of the main obstacles to 
unification. Nahzat-e Islami is a good example of military commanders refusing to unite in 
spite of the agreement of their leaders. Its senior leaders participated in the unification process 
and hosted one of the meetings in their stronghold in the Jaghouri district of Ghazni. 
However, Wasiq, Nehzat’s main military commander in the district, refused to dismantle his 
military structure and continued to operate under the name of Nahzat. This resulted in a 
military confrontation with the formerly Nasr commanders who were fighting on behalf of 
Hizb-e Wahdat. The conflict resulted in the total defeat of Nahzat and other smaller 
organisations in this district in 1993. As a result, Wahdat in Jaghouri and most other parts of 
Ghazni established itself through the military victory of the former Nasr forces (Former Hizb-
e Wahdat official, personal communication, December 2007). 
 
One after the other the smaller parties were pressured or coaxed to join the process. In 
November 1989, the remnant of Behisthi’s Shuray-e Ittefaq also joined. His decision to 
participate in the unification process was a turning point in the development of clerical 
leadership in the Hazarajat, as it symbolised the recognition of Khomeinist hegemony by 
important non-Khomeinist elements of the clergy. Behishi’s Shura was different from other 
organisations. He represented the conservative and non-revolutionary component of the 
ulema. He was a follower of the Khoi school of thought, a moderate, non-political and 
conservative line of thinking opposed to Khomeini’s revolutionary Islamism and dominant 
among Afghan Shiites until the early 1980s. By the time Hizb-e Wahdat was in the making, 
Beheshti was reduced to leading a small fraction of the Shura in Nawur district of Ghazni 
(Ibrahimi 2006).  
 
The ambition to integrate previously hostile organisations into a single party had achieved a 
great degree of success. Officially, all the previous organisations except Harakat were 
dissolved and their military structures were dismantled. A relatively stable political order was 
restored in the areas under its control. However, the party suffered from serious structural 
problems and ideological differences.   
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Balancing Ideology and Ethnicity   
Ideologically, most Hizb-e Wahdat leaders were political Islamists. In a way the formation of 
the party was the culmination of a process of Islamisation of the Hazara anti-Soviet resistance 
groups in Afghanistan. The process was accompanied by the gradual rise to dominance of the 
clergy in the political leadership of the region, and in fact it marked the final victory of the 
clerical Islamists. By unifying under the new name they further consolidated their political 
dominance. The Wahdat manifesto emphasised the continuation and intensification of efforts 
for the creation of an Islamic government based on the Quran and Sunnah.1 It called for 
further efforts to incorporate all other genuine Shiite groups into the party and to act in 
solidarity with all Islamic organisations of the Sunnis. The language of the manifesto clearly 
indicates that Wahdat was to be, at least predominately, a Shiite organisation, despite 
references to solidarity and cooperation with the Sunni organisations. It demanded an equal 
status for Shiite jurisprudence alongside the Hanafi school, dominant among Sunnis in the 
country. As a religious party, Hizb-e Wahdat can be credited with an openness and 
inclusiveness exceptional in a conservative society like Afghanistan. In an exceptional move 
among the Afghan mujahedin, the party included ten women members in its central council 
and had devoted an entire committee for women’s affairs that was headed by a university-
educated Hazara woman (hazara.net 2009). 
 
The main point, however, is that the movement gradually tilted towards its ethnic support 
base. Subsequent political developments in Kabul exposed the difficulties of establishing an 
Islamic government in the country. With the fall of the communist regime in Kabul and the 
failure to form an Islamic government, the warring factions turned to their ethnic and regional 
support bases. While Islamism remained the officially proclaimed ideology of most groups, 
ethnic demands and power struggles surfaced as major sources of political mobilisation.  
Wahdat’s leaders were endeavouring to strike a balance between ethnicity and religion. The 
result was an Islamic ideology used to express and further the rights of a historically 
disadvantaged community; a strong desire for unity of the Hazaras was its main driving force. 
In fact, ideologically, Nasr’s trademark combination of ethnic nationalism and radical 
Islamism increasingly became the ideology of Wahdat, an ethnic discourse dominated by, and 
expressed through, an Islamic language.  
 
Abdul Ali Mazari, a former member of Nasr and first secretary general of Wahdat, was the 
main agent of the explicit transformation of the party into a platform for the rights and 
political demands of the Hazaras. When he arrived in Kabul in 1992, he further opened the 
door of the party to Hazaras of all social and ideological backgrounds. A group of former 
leftists and government bureaucrats joined the inner circle of the party leadership, generating 
further rifts. This was a real test of political tolerance of the more conservative section of the 
clergy. While the party was created to unify the predominantly Islamist and clerical 
organisations, in Kabul it confronted groups of educated Hazaras much larger than had been 
the case in the provinces; these were also mostly leftist and relatively well organised. The 
question of whether the party should accept these individuals divided the party leadership. 
The ulema needed the knowledge and experiences of these educated Hazaras to help the party 
adjust to an urban political setting. The party suffered from a chronic shortage of members 
who had benefited from a modern education. Furthermore, most of the clerics had little 
familiarity with the politics of Kabul. Most of them were educated in religious centres in Iran 
                                                 
1 Sunnah is the second most important source of Islamic law and guidance after the Holy Quran. It is an Arabic 
word that is used to refer to the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad. In Shiite Islam it also includes 
the words and deeds of the Twelve Imam.  
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and Iraq and had mainly engaged in politics in rural Hazarajat. Finally, Wahdat fighters 
lacked military skills suitable to an urban environment. Despite that, many key figures in the 
central council opposed the inclusion of the educated Kabulis in the party, viewing them as 
godless communists. While none of the former leftists were given any position of authority 
within the party leadership, their strengthening relationship with, and perceived influence on, 
Mazari angered the more conservative sections of the party. Most notable in this regard was 
Muhammad Akbari, who consistently opposed Wahdat’s alliance with non-jihadi groups such 
as General Dostum’s Junbesh-i Milli and the Hazara leftists. On the other hand, the leftists did 
not seek any official positions within the party ranks. They were mostly concerned with 
ensuring their personal security and avoiding persecution by the mujahedin (Former Wahdat 
officials, interviews and personal communications, 2005 & 2007). 
 
A Changing Political Strategy  
The idea of building an Islamic government and promoting religious fraternity rapidly ran 
into difficulties. Hizb-e Wahdat’s stance as the representative of the Hazara mujahedin was 
not welcomed by its Sunni counterparts in Peshawar. Instead, it was effectively excluded 
from the negotiations around the formation of a mujahedin government in Kabul, which were 
dominated by the Sunnis. A Hizb-e Wahdat delegation to Peshawar, sent to negotiate a 
possible inclusion in the process, returned to Bamyan badly disappointed. In a central council 
meeting in Bamyan, the delegation headed by Abdul Ali Mazari raised the issue of 
deliberating a new political strategy. Some of the Sunni fundamentalist parties had basically 
ignored the Shiite claims of any form of effective representation in a future government. In 
opposition to Hizb-e Wahdat’s demand of a quarter share in future power-sharing 
arrangements, some of the Sunni parties stated that the Shiites did not count as a significant 
community, deserving to be included in the negotiation process (Harpviken 1995). 
 
Three days of deliberations in the party’s central council in Bamyan produced a new strategy: 
working out an alliance of the country’s historically deprived ethnic communities. This new 
strategy was to be pursued with the military commanders of various communities in the 
provinces rather than with the leaders in Peshawar. Government officials of various ethnic 
communities were also contacted to join or support the new alliance. The new strategy was 
communicated with various political and military players in the country through delegations 
and representatives. Fifty delegations were dispatched to several parts of the country, 
including the Panjshir valley and the northern province of Balkh. Members of the delegations 
were tasked with exploring a common political strategy for collectively bargaining over the 
rights of minorities in future political arrangements (Ustad Baba, personal communication, 
2005; Former Hizb-e Wahdat officials, interviews, 2007; Dawlatabadi 1992: 246). The 
delegations to Panjshir and the north of the country reached important agreements with 
Massoud and the future leaders of the emergent Junbish-e Milli Islami, which underpinned a 
new political agreement that became known as Paiman-e Jabalu- Seraj, or the Jabalu-seraj 
agreement named after the area in Parwan province where one of the final negotiations took 
place in April 1992. Massoud was chosen as head of the new council, Muhammad Mohaqiq 
from Hizb-e Wahdat as his deputy and General Dostum as commander of its military affairs 
(Waezi 1999).  
 
Failure in Political Strategy Splits the Party 
The alliance of Wahdat, Junbesh and Massoud’s Shuray-e Nezar, or Supervisory Council, 
collapsed as they attempted to take control of Kabul. Similarly, the political arrangements 
among the Sunni mujahedin organisations also fell apart, turning the city into a battleground 
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for the most devastating and atrocious conflicts. Wahdat became an important part of the 
conflict for nearly three years. This provoked intense internal debates within the party. The 
questions of external alignments further inflamed the internal tensions. Muhammad Akbari 
rose as leader of a pro-Massoud camp within the party, challenging the wisdom of Mazari’s 
refusal to join Rabbani’s and Massoud’s government and his participation in an alliance with 
Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb-i Islami, who had emerged as the main opposition (Former 
Wahdat official, interview, 2005).  
 
The differences between Mazari and Akbari resulted into the first major split within the party. 
After the split, both leaders maintained separate political and military organisations under the 
name of Wahdat, with Mazari maintaining the main body of the party. The growing rivalries 
and tensions between the two leaders surfaced strongly in the preparations for the party’s 
leadership election in September 1994. The election was held amid a heightened competition 
between the two contending figures for leadership of the party. The party was experiencing its 
most difficult internal power struggle since it had been formed.  New political fault lines were 
emerging as the party leaders tried to define and articulate their political agendas in Kabul. 
Both sides were determined to win in order to dominate leadership positions and consequently 
change the political direction of the party. The venue for the forthcoming elections also 
proved to be contentious. Akbari was pressing for the elections to be held in Bamyan where 
he felt stronger. By contrast, Mazari and his supporters pushed for elections in Kabul where 
he had cultivated a larger support base among urbanised Hazaras. Given the political 
differences and personal rivalries between the two leaders, the first election of the secretary 
general of the party was hotly contested. It was also particularly sensitive given the context of 
the civil war in Kabul, with regards to which both figures were proposing different political 
directions for the party. Akbari hoped he could alter the role of the party in the war and in the 
conflict in Kabul in favour of Rabbani’s government through his election as secretary general 
of the party. Consequently, the election of secretary general gained a paramount importance 
for both sides in the civil war to maintain or change the political alignments of the party in 
their favour (Sarwar Jawadi, interview, 2005). 
 
The elections were held amid a climate of distrust and violence. By gaining 43 votes (out of 
82 members of the central council present), Mazari was re-elected as leader. Akbari with 33 
votes was elected as his first deputy. Similarly, agreements were reached on 20 other key 
appointments. Akbari’s faction won the positions of heads of cultural and military 
committees, which they had strongly pressed for. He and his supporters believed that by 
dominating the cultural and military committees they could manipulate the war and 
propaganda machine of the party in favour of the Rabbani government, their external ally. 
Karim Khalili, who would later become the leader of the party, was elected as chief of its 
political affairs committee. The voting patterns during the elections offer important insights 
into the internal politics of the party. Members of Nasr and Pasdaran, the two largest and 
most powerful numerically and politically, dominated the process as well as the two emergent 
factions. While Nasr maintained its cohesiveness, most other smaller organisations were 
divided. All former members of Nasr in the council voted for Mazari, testifying to the lasting 
cohesiveness of Nasr as a political block within Wahdat. By contrast, while most former 
members of Pasdaran supported Akbari, some of them cast their votes for Mazari. For 
instance, Ali Jan Zahidi, Ghulam Hussain Shafaq, Hayatullah Balaghi and Abdul Ahmed 
Fayaz, previously important local leaders of Pasdaran, threw their support behind Mazari. 
Similarly, most former members of Harakat and Nahzat followed Pasdaran, while most of 
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Sazman-e Daawat and Mostazafin supported Mazari. Other organisations such as Shuray-e 
Ittefaq and Jabh-e Motahid were bitterly divided.2 
 
Morever, distrust and suspicions continued to undermine the new appointments. The role of 
external players, particularly that of Rabbani’s government, was crucial. It is believed that the 
Rabbani government had been working through their contacts with Akbari to undermine 
Mazari and turn Hizb-e Wahdat into an ally. Mazari strongly suspected Akbari of trying to 
undermine him. A few weeks after the party elections, in response to an alleged coup plan by 
Akbari and sections of Harakat against him, Mazari ordered his troops to attack and expel all 
his opponents from the western part of the capital. Consequently, Akbari, his supporters and 
his allies in Harakat were forced to flee into areas controlled by Massoud in the north of the 
capital. While the exact details of the alleged plot remain unknown, Mazari later claimed that 
Qasim Fahim, then Rabbani’s head of the intelligence department, was working with Akbari 
to militarily force him out of leadership. According to the allegations, Massoud was funding 
and arming as many as 20,000 troops to allow Akbari to take over Wahdat’s leadership in 
Kabul and establish its control in Hazarajat as well.3 
 
The split opened a deep and long standing political division among the Hazaras of 
Afghanistan. While Mazari and his successor Khalili commanded the support of most of the 
Hazaras, Akbari mostly operated in opposition to them. Following the death of Mazari at the 
hands of the Taliban in March 1995, Khalili was elected as the new party leader. He 
reorganised the party, re-established control over the Hazarajat region and joined Massoud 
and Junbesh against the newly emerged Taliban threat in a new alliance called the Supreme 
Council for Defence of the Motherland, which was later known as the ‘northern alliance’. In 
contrast, Akbari joined the Taliban when they took control of Bamyan in September 1998.  
 
Post-Taliban Reconstruction of Hizb-e Wahdat 
In its history, the party suffered three major defeats. The first defeat was marked by its 
downfall in Kabul and the death of Mazari at the hands of the Taliban in March 1995. 
Secondly, in August 1998 the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif was overrun by the Taliban; the 
city was the second important centre of the northern alliance after the fall of Kabul and also 
held a major concentration of Wahdat’s troops and civilian Hazaras. Hizb-e Wahdat had 
played the key role in repelling a Taliban offensive on the city in 1997 and was to bear the 
brunt of Taliban anger this time. Thousands of Hazaras were massacred or imprisoned. 
Thirdly, in a few weeks the Taliban captured Bamyan, the new headquarters of the party, in 
another dramatic move. This marked the end of Hizb-e Wahdat’s political life as a cohesive 
political organisation. The fall of these two cities proved to be much more than military 
defeats. Nearly all of the territories under its control were captured by the Taliban. Its political 
and military cadres fled into neighbouring countries. Khalili went to Iran. From amongst the 
senior leaders, only Muhaqiq after a brief period in Iran returned quickly to Afghanistan and 
organised a resistance front in the Balkhab district of Saripul. Wahdat It never managed to 
recover after the fall of Mazar and Bamyan into the hands of the Taliban, because of the high 
losses in its rank and file and at the leadership levels (Ibrahimi 2009b).  
 
Thus Hizb-e Wahdat participated in the post-Taliban political process with little of its past 
political and military weight. Wahdat still claimed to represent the Hazaras and the Hazarajat 
region fell under its control as the Taliban regime was overthrown. In the Interim 
                                                 
2 Information obtained by the author from various sources, during 2006-7 in Kabul.  
3 Ibid 
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Administration (2001-2002), Wahdat had a modest weight; Muhammad Mohaqiq represented 
the party as one of the deputy chairmen and Minister of Planning. Members of Harakat and 
Akbari’s Wahdat mostly represented the Shiites in the Interim Administration as well as the 
Transitional Administration in 2002-2003. Moreover, in the new political circumstances, the 
party needed to adapt to the new political realities in the country. The new political order 
established under the auspices of the international community required the military-political 
organisations to transform into civilian political parties. This entailed disbanding their 
military wings, disarming under the UN-led Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
programme and operating under the new legal and political environment. As mentioned 
earlier, Hizb-e Wahdat’s military structure disintegrated under the Taliban, and as a result in 
late 2001 the organisation was in no way comparable to other anti-Taliban organisations in 
terms of military structure and hardware. Its leaders lacked the political and military resources 
to reorganise their fighters on any significant scale. In June 2005 the only major military 
structure controlled by the party, the Ninth Corps, was disbanded, ending financial support 
from the centre to Wahdat’s military wing.4 Lacking resources and with a weak organisation, 
the party saw its military activities almost come to a halt; only in northern Afghanistan did 
some elements of it survive. Wahdat’s weakness vis-à-vis other, better resourced military-
political organisations was compounded. On the positive side, its leaders can claim credit for 
effectively having given up their military wing.  
 
The second and most pressing demand for reform came from within the Hazara political 
community. Reforming and reviving the party as the largest and most influential Hazara 
organisation was a central priority for most of the Hazara intellectual and clerical elites. Many 
educated Hazaras of various ideological backgrounds rushed to Kabul in 2002 and 
volunteered to play a role in the party. Ideas for reform and restructuring the party were 
presented to Karim Khalili and Muhammad Mohaqiq, who were seen as the key leaders. 
While the need to change and broaden the party leadership has frequently been acknowledged 
by both Mohaqiq and Khalili, most reformists (including clerics) have been frustrated by lack 
of practical will and determination of the senior leaders.5 With the disintegration of its 
military structures and the necessity to transform into a full political party, Hizb-e Wahdat 
faced an extremely difficult challenge that required radical changes. 
 
The transition from a military to political organisation has been similarly difficult for other 
Afghan organisations created during the years of war (Giustozzi 2009). But Hizb-e Wahdat 
faced a unique predicament of its own, deriving from the emergence of a much larger 
educated class among the Hazaras. Wahdat’s political cadres were mostly clerics educated in 
religious schools in Afghanistan or in Iran and Iraq. In their rise to political leadership they 
fiercely competed with university-educated challengers and remained sceptical and fearful of 
modern educated politicians. They suddenly found themselves forced to engage with western 
notions of democracy, human rights etcetera. As in 1992, opening the doors of the party to 
more educated Hazara cadres was a precondition for meeting reformist expectations, but the 
return to the country of many young Hazaras educated in Iran and Pakistan was out of all 
proportion with the threat that had been represented by the limited number of leftists and 
government officials welcomed into Wahdat in 1992. After 2001, the party nominally 
maintained its old structure in which seven of the eleven commissions within the Jaghouri of 
the party were chaired by ulema.6 Only technical and insignificant positions such as health 
                                                 
4 http://mosharekat.wahdat.net/index.php?num=116&id=867. 
5 This is based on author’s conversation and interviews with a significant number of former Wahdat officials and 
intellectuals that were involved in the debates and proposals for reforming Wahdat during 2005-8.  
6 It is important to note that after the fall of Bamyan into the hands of the Taliban these structures, including the 
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and archaeological committees were headed by non-clerical figures. Furthermore, the non-
clerical figures were mostly acting on behalf of their senior clerical leaders (hazara.net 2009). 
But an opening of the party to the growing secular intelligentsia meant that their monopoly 
over the political leadership of Hazara society risked being undermined (Ibrahimi 2006).  
 
While a few of Wahdat’s founders continued to exercise leadership and political power, most 
others were not as lucky. The failure to revive party structures left many of them politically 
marginalised. Second rank officials of Hizb-e Wahdat, such as most members of the central 
council, have mostly been unable to find a state job. Many of them opted to reside in their 
home areas in the Hazarajat, far away from leaderships in Kabul (Mr. Natiqi, interview, 
2007). 
 
Personalist Leadership and Political Fragmentation  
The situation of Hizb-e Wahdat in early 2009 and its political fragmentation can best be 
explained by the leadership style of its leaders. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the 
Taliban, Khalili was widely recognised as leader of the party. In April 2002 he flew to Kabul 
from Bamyan, in a move that shifted the party headquarters to Kabul. He was warmly 
received by Mohaqiq, who was deputy chair and Planning Minister of the Interim 
Administration, and other senior figures of the organisation. In the Transitional 
Administration, Khalili replaced Mohaqiq as a vice-president, becoming the highest Hazara 
official in the government. Until before the presidential election of 2005, Muhaqiq was at 
least officially heading the political affairs committee of Hizb-e Wahdat in Kabul. Their 
relationship, however, soon started unravelling. Apparently, Muhaqiq had adopted a more 
confrontational approach within the government on the issues of development and 
reconstruction plans in Hazara areas. It is alleged that his powers as the Minister of Planning 
were being transferred to the more powerful and assertive finance ministry, under the 
leadership of the western educated technocrat Ashraf Ghani. Mohaqiq left the cabinet in 
controversy in 2004 (BBC Persian Service, March 13, 2004). Khalili and Mohaqeq have since 
engaged in personal rivalry and competition for power within the government as well as for 
leadership among the Hazaras. Their rivalry came to the fore when Mohaqiq decided to stand 
as a candidate for presidential elections in 2005 and Khalili ran as the second vice-president 
with Karzai. Subsequently, Mohaqiq joined the main opposition alliance, the Understanding 
Front, led by Yonus Qanuni. By standing in opposition to the government, he championed the 
rights of Hazaras and continued to undermine Karim Khalili.7 The personalisation of 
leadership was not limited to Mohaqiq and Khalili and resulted in the fragmentation of the 
party into the following four splinter organisations: 
 
Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan  
Its leader Karim Khalili is a native of the Behsud district of Wardak province.  Like most of 
Hazara mujahedin leaders he was educated at religious madrasahs. After a brief period of 
involvement in military activities in the early 1980s, he was mostly representing Sazman-e 
Nasr and later Hizb-e Wahdat in Iran and Pakistan. For a brief period in the late 1980s he led 
a section of Nasr, called Nasr-e Nawin (New Nasr), a grouping of mostly young members 
opposed to the formation of Hizb-e Wahdat. However, as the party was formed he joined it as 
its representative in Peshawar. During his years of experience as the party’s foreign 
representative he has acquired out of the ordinary diplomatic skills, standing out among his 
                                                                                                                                                        
central council, were never convened in reality. But previous officials claimed to retain their old titles in the 
party.  
7 This is based on author’s own observation of political debates amongst the Hazaras in Kabul, 2004-5. 
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peers and rivals in the party (Close aide to Khalili, interview; Afghanistan Islamic Unity Party 
2004). 
 
Khalili claims credit for having served as immediate successor to Mazari and having revived 
the party after its virtual collapse in Kabul. For a period of three years, Khalili presided over a 
renewed Hazara political mobilisation and military and political power of the party in 
Bamyan.  He established his control over nearly the entire Hazarjat region. Under his 
leadership the party regained its political and military relevance as one of the major anti-
Taliban organisations. 
 
In September 2004, Khalili’s Wahdat-e Islami organised its Constituent Assembly in Kabul in 
which five hundred people participated. The assembly approved a new constitution for the 
party, and reconfirmed Khalili as its leader (he was the only candidate) by a unanimous vote. 
Sarwar Danish, then Minister of Justice, and Habibah Wahaj, a female lecturer at Kabul 
University, were elected as first and second deputies respectively. A central council of 99 
members was also elected (Musharekat Weekly, September 13, 2004). The new constitution 
of the party also provides for establishment of provincial, district and village structures for the 
party. But in reality, after the presidential elections of 2004, the enthusiasm for 
institutionalising the party evaporated. Even in Kabul, there were little signs of party 
activities. A participant of the Constituents Assembly claimed that the council never 
convened and functioned as an entity within the party after it was formed (Participant of the 
Constituent Assembly, personal communication, 2009). 
 
In contrast to Muhaqiq, Khalili consistently worked with the Karzai government. In his role 
as the second vice-president, he was the highest ranking Hazara official. In such a position he 
has been able to support a network of allies, influence government appointments in the 
Hazarajat and distribute limited economic and political patronage. On the other hand, he 
never had access to sufficient resources to address the demands of the wider strata of the 
Hazara population, who remained sceptical of the governments in Kabul. Although the 
overall situation had significantly improved for the Hazaras following the collapse of the 
Taliban regime, widespread dissatisfaction among the community over the distribution of aid 
and economic development projects was easy to detect and Khalili was blamed for that. 
Under such circumstances, Mohaqiq’s populism appealed to the Hazaras’ sense of unfair 
treatment, gaining him the image of the only leader speaking out on behalf of his community.8 
 
Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan  
The party is the vehicle of the chief challenger to Khalili’s claim to political leadership among 
the Hazaras, Muhammad Mohaqiq. Mohaqiq rose to prominence during the years of jihad in 
his native Balkh province. He became the provincial leader of Nasr, the most powerful 
Hazara organisation there. After the dominant figure of Nasr in the north, Mazari, moved to 
Bamyan and later Kabul and engaged in politics at the higher level, Mohaqiq succeeded him 
in the leadership of the northern region. It was under him that the party briefly dominated the 
                                                 
8 The sense of exclusion from large scale development policies is increasingly widespread and evident among 
the Hazaras. Many feel that despite historical deprivation and economic underdevelopment, the Hazarajat region 
has not been receiving its fair share of the foreign aid and development assistance since 2001. In a symbolic 
protest, in April 2009, residents of Bamyan plastered parts of the narrow four kilometre road with clay and 
straws to protest and attract the attention of the Kabul government and international community as to 
reconstruction and development of the region (BBC Persian Service, April 11, 2009). 
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politics of the region, including by playing a central role in the defence of Mazar-e Sharif 
against Taliban incursions in the late 1990s.  
 
By declaring his candidacy in the presidential elections, Muhaqiq challenged Khalili’s 
leadership of Hizb-e Wahdat as well as of the Hazaras. As the only Hazara presidential 
contender, Muhaqiq mobilised a large section of the Hazara populace behind his candidacy. 
Hazara support for his candidacy was more an attempt to send a strong message to the 
government and assert the ethnic group’s role at the national level than the result of direct 
support for him as an individual candidate or for his party platform. As a result, Mohaqiq 
claimed a strong majority of Hazara votes in the election and ranked third among the 
candidates in terms of the percentage of all votes. However, Mohaqiq’s erratic political 
alignments prevented him from consolidating his leadership. In 2001-4 he managed to be part 
of the cabinet, and was close to Karzai until 2004 before joining the opposition National 
Understanding Front, the coalition of opposition groups spearheaded by Yonus Qanuni. 
During the election of the parliamentary speaker in 2005 he switched back to the government 
camp. Although he failed to obtain the post of deputy speaker of the parliament, through his 
alliance with the pro-Karzai camp he managed to secure sufficient support for his candidate 
for the position of Minister of Transport (Hazara member of Parliament, interview, 2009). 
 
Mohaqiq reached the top of his popularity among Hazaras during his presidential election 
campaign. During this brief period, his faction of Hizb-e Wahdat attracted a dramatic level of 
support among Hazara intellectuals as well as commoners. A large number of educated 
Hazaras were mobilised to run his campaign programmes and publications. The spontaneous 
mobilisation was achieved through Mohaqiq’s strong appeal among Hazaras on important 
issues. Firstly, he repeatedly raised the issue of the lack of important development projects in 
the Hazarajat. By stressing the need for balanced development strategy in the country, he 
called for construction of a highway connecting Kabul and Herat through Hazarajat. 
Secondly, he called for restructuring the administrative division of the region by creating five 
new Hazara provinces. Thirdly, he appealed to the Hazaras’ ethnic identity. He spoke of large 
mobilisation during the elections to demonstrate the numerical strength of the community. In 
a way, like most Hazaras he aimed to use the electoral platform as a way of asserting the 
Hazaras as the third largest ethnic group and an important political force in the country. 
Crucially for this analysis, Mohaqiq repeatedly said that he would invest on the momentum 
built by his candidacy to create a truly institutionalised political party (Mosharekat Weekly, 
October 2005). 
 
However, once the elections were over, Mohaqiq’s interest in institutionalising a political 
party also declined. He even stopped supporting Entekhab, the weekly published during his 
campaign. The educated cadre left his office with a bad taste in their mouth. He switched 
back to his own personal style of leadership, largely centred on his maverick style and 
political opportunism. By shedding whatever organised following had gathered around him, 
he gained the ability to take political decisions and form alliances according to the needs of 
the moment, without the hindrance of a political party to be carried with him. He was only 
consulting with a limited number of aides and friends (Aide of Mohaqiq, personal 
communication, 2007). 
 
Whatever the short-term gains of this style of leadership, it impacted negatively on his long-
term standing among his supporters. In a surprising move, he entered into an alliance with 
Abdur Rasul Sayaf to secure his support for the post of deputy speaker of the parliament, in 
exchange for his support for Sayyaf’s candidacy to the post of speaker of the parliament. 
 13
Because of the bloody conflicts between Hizb-e Wahdat and Sayaf’s forces during the civil 
war in Kabul (1993-95), this move strongly compromised his credibility. Typically, the 
decision was taken within a small circle of aides. To justify his decision he alleged that he and 
his allies were under tremendous pressures by the government. For instance, he asserted that 
his Hazara supporters were being ousted from government positions and pressured in various 
forms in his native stronghold in Balkh province by Governor Atta Muhammad, one of 
Mohaqiq’s long-standing rivals. He justified the move as a step to reduce this mounting 
pressure. It was not lost on the many Hazaras, however, that he had contested the top political 
post in the country and rallied most Hazara voters in order to gain leverage for his own 
political manoeuvres (Aide of Mohaqiq, personal communication, 2007; Salsal Weekly, 
October 3, 2006).  
 
Hizb-e Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan  
As discussed earlier, Muhammad Akbari had mostly been at odds with leaders of the main 
body of Hizb-e Wahdat and was encouraged by the Khalili-Mohaqiq split to organise his own 
separate political faction. As an ethnic Qizilbash he has always stressed Shiite Islamism 
against the growing Hazara nationalism in the party and consistently sought external alliances 
to bolster his relatively weak base of support within Wahdat.. He established his first contact 
with Massoud as head of Hizb-e Wahdat delegation visiting Panjshir immediately after the 
party was formed, becoming a consistent ally of Massoud within the party. This was one of 
the major contentious issues between him and Mazari, who was fighting with Massoud’s 
forces for control of Kabul.  Then, when Khalili joined the National United Front in the 
battles against the Taliban, Akbari established contacts with the Taliban leadership. He was 
the main Shiite figure to surrender to the Taliban and cooperate with them in maintaining 
control of the region. The alignment with the Taliban placed him in a disadvantageous 
position after the regime collapsed in late 2001. Not surprisingly, the government in Kabul 
was dominated by the anti-Taliban resistance organisations that worked with the US-led 
coalition to overthrow the Taliban and capture Kabul. As a result he and his organisation were 
left outside the government.  
 
However, his alignment with the Taliban and the role he played in at least reducing and 
preventing large scale atrocities in his native Bamyan improved his standing in the province. 
This helped him secure a seat in the National Assembly in the 2005 parliamentary elections. 
But his party also suffered another split. Mustafa Kazimi, a key figure who was his minister 
of commerce in the interim and transitional administration, formed his own party, Eqtedar-e 
Milli. As a result, subsequently Akbari has only been playing a marginal role in the politics 
(Akbari 2007).  
 
Hizb-e Wahdat Islami Millat-e Afghanistan      
Led by Qurban Ali Erfani, an instrumental figure in the establishment of the party and first 
deputy leader under Karim Khalili, this party was the fourth split emerging from Hizb-e 
Wahdat. A native of Yakawlang district of Bamyan and one of the founders of Nasr and Hizb-
e Wahdat, Erfani has always been at the centre of Hazara politics. His party was registered at 
the Ministry of Justice in March 2005. However, despite being regarded as a key founder and 
veteran of Hizb-e Wahdat, he has demonstrated little political weight as an autonomous 
political player.  
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Reproduction of Clerical Networks  
Since expectations of reviving the party did not materialise, the political and military cadres 
of the organisation transformed into a loose and fluid network of allies and friends. Neither 
Mohaqiq nor Khalili managed to build a cohesive political organisation that could command 
the loyalty of its followers. Instead, they allowed local leaders at district and provincial levels 
to fluctuate politically, following what their local interests and aspirations demanded. This 
situation is an interesting translation of Shiite clerical networks into a political organisation. 
Traditionally, Shiite clerics have been operating and relating to one another through a vertical 
network of friends and followers across national boundaries. At the top the network was 
centred on the highest echelon of religious clerics, usually called mujtahed. The mujtahed is 
the highest religious authority qualified to release religious decrees, and collect and 
redistribute religious donations from his members. He maintains the exclusive authority to 
promote or demote members of his network and appoint representatives in areas beyond his 
personal reach. Today’s Hizb-e Wahdat under Khalili and Mohaqiq explicitly resembles a 
Shiite clerical network. Of course, none of the current Hizb-e Wahdat leaders qualified as 
mujtaheds. But their political behaviour and the relationship with their supporters resembled 
that of the mujtahed and moqallid relationship, or leader-follower, in Shiite religious 
networks. Clearly, clerics have created a political network corresponding to their experiences 
and madrasa world view. Both Mohaqiq and Khalili were distributing favours and resources 
and were rarely accountable to their constituencies in their political alignments and decision 
making. They activate their networks to orchestrate mass mobilisation at times of need. Based 
in Kabul, they command a wide network of loyalists and supporters in different provinces. In 
the words of one of the former member of the party’s central council, the two leaders would 
act together only if their political interests permitted. He stressed that their interests at that 
time lay in the pursuit of separate political strategies (Former member of Hizb-e Wahdat’s 
central council, personal communication, 2008). 
 
This kind of patrimonial leadership has also meant exclusively personal and in some cases 
familial control of the party’s resources. The control of resources offered to the leaders an 
enormous leverage in their relationship with junior figures of the Wahdat ‘galaxy’, by 
enabling them to distribute favour and money to maintain support and loyalty. The post-
Taliban leadership of Hizb-e Wahdat in its various off-shoots achieved an unprecedented 
level of wealth and property ownership. Most notably Karim Khalili is widely accused of 
accumulating wealth and properties through his position as party leader. In the words of one 
of the former high ranking officials of Hizb-e Wahdat, many of the top level of Hizb-e 
Wahdat officials have become transformed from politicians into big businessmen and 
entrepreneurs. This has contributed to further widen the gap between the leaders and their 
constituencies both politically and economically (Former Hizb-e Wahdat official, interview, 
2008). 
 
What further exacerbated the situation was the concentration of the Hizb-e Wahdat leadership 
in Kabul. Mohaqiq, Khalili and Akbari moved to Kabul where they engaged in endless 
personal rivalries and power politics. In the absence of a political structure in the territory, all 
the resources usually controlled by the leaders also shifted to the capital. This has resulted in a 
near total vacuum of political leadership in previously important centres of Hizb-e Wahdat 
activities such as Mazar and Bamyan. This author had a difficult time trying to interview 
Hizb-e Wahdat officials in Bamyan during a visit in summer 2006. Their nominal party 
offices outside Kabul were either staffed by a single individual or closed most of the times. 
The gap between the party leaders and their constituencies could only widen as a result.  
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With the exception of Akbari’s faction, which promoted fundamentally different political 
strategies compared to the main body of Wahdat under Mazari and Khalili and also stressed 
religion at the expense of ethnicity, there is little in ideological terms that can distinguish the 
various off-shoots of Hizb-e Wahdat from one another. Among those who claimed Mazari’s 
political heritage, the fault lines were not articulated along any important political or 
ideological lines. Competition for power within the government in Kabul and personal 
rivalries inside the party has been at the heart of politics between Mohaqiq and Khalili. In the 
absence of internal deliberative structures, enabling the reaching of a consensus, power 
struggles within the party took the shape of extreme forms of personalised tensions and 
rivalries. Khalili’s tight trip on the party leadership enabled him to resist attempts by other 
contenders to rise, despite his weak health and lack of personal charisma. As Mohaqiq was 
emerging as the party’s number two figure by virtue of his military role in fighting the 
Taliban and of his participation in the Karzai administrations, he attempted to raise his profile 
in a way that directly challenged Khalili’s leadership.  
 
The competition between the two focused on claiming the heritage of the original Hizb-e 
Wahdat, rather than on competitive projects of institution building. Mazari’s role in formation 
of Wahdat and his death at the hands of the Taliban has earned him an iconic status among 
the Hazaras. He is widely recognised as Baba Mazari, or father Mazari. With the exception 
for Akbari’s, each of the present factions is struggling to claim to be the genuine heir of 
Mazari and Hizb-e Wahdat’s role in defence and promotion of Hazara rights during the civil 
war and Taliban regime. This is most intense on the occasion of the commemoration of the 
anniversary of Mazari’s death: every year both Mohaqiq and Khalili have invested significant 
efforts and resources to outshine one another. It is also worth pointing out that apart from 
Kazimi, none of the factional leaders was willing to sacrifice the Wahdat label and all the 
offshoots maintained Wahdat as part of their name. 
 
At the same time, Wahdat’s factional leaders collaborated in an oligopolistic way to prevent 
any serious newcomer from entering the Hazara political scene. In this sense, their reluctance 
or refusal to accommodate demands for change and the establishment of functional, 
institutionalised political organisations can be seen as the attempt to prevent the rise of new 
leaders through a consensus mechanism for the selection of the elites (Former Hizb-e Wahdat 
official, personal communication, 2007). This type of attitude is one of the underlying causes 
of the growing political fragmentation and frustrations within the ranks of Hazara social elites 
and intelligentsia, as well as of the fragmentation of Hizb-e Wahdat itself. Personalised 
politics and resistance to change and participation had little to offer to these constituencies, 
which gradually distanced themselves from the Wahdat ‘galaxy’. Increasingly, the parties 
derived from Wahdat were reduced to single leaders surrounded by their friends, confidants 
and cronies. 
 
The weakness of Hizb-e Wahdat was nowhere more evident than in the Afghan parliament. 
Both Mohaqiq and Khalili competed to draw Hazara parliamentarians to their sides, but to no 
avail. Mohaqiq, who had been the most proactive in reaching out to mass support after 2001, 
could at best claim the support of half a dozen of the around forty Hazara parliamentarians 
already in the first year of the assembly. By 2007, support for the two leaders among MPs had 
shrunk further and the two leaders could only count on the loyalty and support of two MPs 
each (Hazara member of the Parliament, personal communication, January 2006. 
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Conclusion  
The formation of Hizb-e Wahdat represented an important step in the political development of 
Afghanistan’s Hazaras. Firstly, it unified all the political groups of a community that has 
historically been notoriously fragmented and divided, and it marked the end of a devastating 
civil war and (temporarily) of factionalism in the Hazarajat region. Secondly, it symbolised 
the consolidation of the supremacy and political leadership of the Hazara clergy who had, in 
the previous years, totally defeated other social and political groups in the region. Thirdly, the 
fact that the party was established and headquartered inside the country and outside the direct 
influence of the Iranians, who had been sponsoring the Shiite clerics during the years of Jihad, 
symbolised the growing autonomy of the Hazara clergy. Bamyan, as headquarters of the 
party, was to become an important national political and military centre for more than a 
decade. The city gained its importance as a centre of the Hazaras’ political leadership where 
large numbers of clerics and militants were concentrated during the following years.  
 
The dramatic changes in the political circumstances of the country since its formation shaped 
the nature and political leadership of the party. During the civil wars of Kabul in the early 
1990s, wittingly or unwittingly the party was involved in one of the bloodiest and most 
devastating conflicts in the country. Despite the Islamist background of the party leaders, the 
course of political developments in the post-Soviet era drove the party towards an ethnic 
platform, which promoted ethnic equality and social justice for the Hazaras. However, the 
transition from Islamist ideology to an ethnic agenda created an internal tension that split the 
party and dramatically polarised the Hazara community.  
 
Despite its patchy background and composition, the formation of the party was an important 
step forward in the evolution of political process among the Hazaras, in terms of its relatively 
high degree of inclusiveness and of the lobbying power that it granted to the community. For 
this reason, for some time it appeared that the party had accumulated sufficient political 
capital to bring stability and political leadership to the region. The failure to deliver on these 
promises and the subsequent dissipation of the political capital can be put down to the lack of 
real mechanisms for accountability, selection of the political leadership and collegial decision 
making. The fact that the leaders were chosen for life and with absolute authority also made it 
more difficult for Wahdat to adjust to change. Gradually, the party lost the inclusiveness, 
cohesiveness and legitimacy it had enjoyed in early days following its establishment. As of 
2009 it could be strongly argued that it was no longer a functioning political entity. In the 
words of a Hazara commentator, ‘each rival party under the name of Wahdat is a cloak sewn 
to fit the size of the main contenders of the political leadership of the Hazaras’ (Amiri 2004). 
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Glossary 
Eatelaf:  alliance 
Etefaq:  unity 
Hazaras: the third largest of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups who are mostly Shiite in terms 
of religion.  
Hazarajat:  the predominantly Hazara central highlands of Afghanistan, including districts 
in nine central and northern provinces. 
Hizb:   party, association 
Madrasah:  Islamic high school. 
Misaq:  treaty or convention 
Mujahedin:  plural of mujahed, holy fighters, the militants that fought the jihad against the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. 
Nahzat:  movement  
Nasr:   victory 
Pasdaran:  guardians  
Shura:   council, assembly 
Taliban:  plural of Taleb meaning knowledge seeker 
Wahdat:  unity, oneness 
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